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The Liability of Cigarette
Manufacturers for Lung Cancer: An
Analysis of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and
Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort
Against Cigarette Manufacturers
INTRODUCTION
In the past, tobacco manufacturers have been held liable
for producing products containing such distasteful substances
as human toes,1 mice; 2 small snakes, 3 nails, 4 fishhooks,5 metal
particles,6 and worms.7 When plaintiffs brought claims for in-
juries caused by the native ingredients of tobacco smoke, 8 how-
' Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest P roposal, 53 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1423, 1425 (1980); see Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365 (Miss.
1918).
2 Garner, supra note 1, at 1425; see Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 241
N.Y.S. 233 (N.Y. App. Term. 1930), affd mem., 249 N.Y.S. 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931).
3 Garner, supra note 1, at 1425.
Garner, supra note 1, at 1425; see Werner v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 176 N.E. 114
(Mass. 1931).
1 Garner, supra note 1, at 1425; see Corum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 171 S.E.
78 (N.C. 1933).
6 Garner, supra note 1, at 1425; see Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Wallace, 69
S,W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
7 Garner, supra note 1, at 1425; see Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankm, 54
S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1932).
1 "Among the more obnoxaous components are carbon monoxide, mcotine and tar,
acrolem, hydrocyanic acid, nitric oxade, nitrogen dioxide, cresols, phenol, acetaldehyde,
acetone, acetonitrile, acrylonitrile, ammoma, benzene, 2-3 butadione, carbon dioxide, cro-
tononitrile, ethylamme, formaldehyde, hydrogen sulfide, methacrolem, methyl alcohol, meth-
ylamme, butylanme, dimethylamme, DDT, endrm, furfural, hydroqumone, nickel compounds,
and pyridine." Garner, supra note 1, at 1425 n.23 (citing U.S. DEPARTMeNT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENm, ch.
1, at 30 (1979)).
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ever, the tobacco manufacturers historically have enjoyed
immunity from liability 9
Today this immumty is in jeopardy With the recent revival
of strict liability cases involving cancer-plagued plaintiffs, 10
cigarette manufacturers have found themselves subject to new
potential liability
Plaintiffs' strict liability claims against cigarette manufac-
turers are based primarily on inadequate warnings and design
defects." While manufacturers argue these claims are pre-
empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 12
plaintiffs contend they are not preempted. This Comment will
analyze these positions 3 and examine in detail the risk-utility
analysis to determine whether strict liability should be extended
to cigarette manufacturers. 14 Furthermore, taking into consid-
eration Kentucky's strong tobacco interests, emphasis will be
directed toward how Kentucky courts should treat plaintiffs'
strict liability claims against cigarette manufacturers.'I
9 See id. at 1425.
- The number of strict liability cases involving cigarette manufacturers' liability for
lung cancer has increased sharply in the past few years. Note, Plaintiff's Conduct as a
Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARv. L. Ray. 809, 809-10 (1986);
see, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987); Johnson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. H-86-1343, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1986) (order granting defendants' motion
for partial summary judgment); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F Supp. 1189
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986); Sahli v. Manville
Corp., No. 230512, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County May 12, 1987); Forster
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip op. (Minn. Dist. CL Hennepin County
July 2, 1987) (order and memorandum granting defendant's motion for sutmmary judgment);
Reach v. American Tobacco Co., No. L-08714-83, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Camden County Feb. 13, 1987) (transcript of proceedings on preemption motion); Dewey
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 523 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct, Law Div. 1986); Loving v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-48386, slip op. (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris County March
27, 1987) (order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment); Tyson v,
Monsanto Co., No. 85-CV-0682, slip op. (Tex. Dist. Ct. Galveston County March 17, 1987)
(order on motion for partial summary judgment).
t See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 184; Dewey, 523 A.2d at 712.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982) [hereinafter Labeling Act]; see infra note 40.
See infra notes 16-122 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
,1 See infra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1913, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company introduced the
Camel cigarette to this country 16 After World War I, cigarettes
became very popular, and the tobacco industry initiated an
immense advertising campaign, convincing the American public
that cigarette smoking was socially acceptable.' 7 Cigarette man-
ufacturers also addressed the health consequences of smoking,
advertising that smoking was a healthy activity 18 It was not
until the 1950s that consumers were informed of the association
between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 19 This reality intro-
duced an outbreak of litigation throughout the 1950s, 1960s,
and early 1970s regarding cigarette manufacturers' liability to-
ward plaintiffs who claimed to have acquired lung cancer as a
result of smoking.
20
The tobacco industry has enjoyed a life of civil immumty
in a world of products liability 21 Manufacturers of dangerous
26 Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis 51 CoRNBU L.Q. 678, 679
(1966).
1Id.
"1 Id. at 680. Wegman notes:
A 1932 Lucky Strike advertisement inquired, "Do You Inhale?" and reassured
rhetorically: "What's there to be afraid of?" Old Gold followed m rapid
order with its familiar slogan: "Not a Cough m a Carload." Camel introduced
its well-known "T-Zone" m 1936, promising the smoker that both Is taste
and hIs throat would react favorably to Camel's mildness. In addition, the
statement that "More Doctors Smoke Camels" carred implications that Cam-
els were healthier than other brands.
Id.
"Id.
: Note, supra note 10, at 809; see, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427
F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Ross v. Phillip Morrs & Co., 328 F.2d
3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Cooper v. R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (lst Cir.
1958); Albnght v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd,
485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974). See generally Garner, supra
note 1, at 1426-28 (Professor Garner gives a very interesting discussion of the holdings and
rationale in a few of these early cases involving liability of cigarette manufacturers for lung
cancer.).
2, Garner, supra note 1, at 1423.
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products such as automobiles22 and drugs2 3 have been held
strictly liable for injuries involving their products while tobacco
manufacturers have escaped liability. Many believe this immu-
mity is a direct consequence of the tremendous lobbying pres-
sures put on Congress by the tobacco industry. 24
Notwithstanding this theory, cigarette manufacturers have en-
joyed civil immuity in lung cancer cases.
In the past, courts have used theories of negligence, express
and implied warranty, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation,
and assumption of risk in their analysis of cases involving
cigarette manufacturers' liability 25 Presently, strict liability26
appears to be the best alternative for plaintiffs when bringing
civil action against cigarette manufacturers.27 The recent cases
of Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc.,2 Dewey v R.J Reynolds
2 See Hennngsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (autmobile
manufacturer held liable for defective automobile); see also Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965) (brake manufacturer held liable for tractor braking system
malfunction).
21 Crocker v. Winthrop Lab., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (drug manufacturer held
liable for decedent's death resulting from drug addiction).
White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers and Assumption of Risk, 29 LA.
L. REv. 589, 601 (1969). "Let's face it though. When you combine the money and power
of the tobacco and liquor interests with advertising agencies, newspapers, radios, and
television there is too much political muscle involved to expect much accomplishment."
Id. at 601 n.63 (citing Gimlin, Regulation of the Cigarette Industry, 2 ErroPjAL RES. REP.
867, 869 (1967)).
21 See Hudson, 427 F.2d at 541 (negligence); Green, 409 F.2d at 1166 (implied
warranty); Pritchard, 370 F.2d at 95 (negligence and express warranty); Ross, 328 F.2d at
3 (implied warranty, negligence, and misrepresentation); Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 19 (negligence
and implied warranty); Cooper, 256 F.2d at 464 (fraud); White, supra note 24, at 589. See
generally Garner, supra note 1, at 1434-37 (Professor Garner provides a good discussion of
the theones available to plaintiffs.). Although theories of negligence, express and implied
warranty, and assumption of risk are currently used by courts, this Comment will focus on
a discussion of strict liability claims.
26" 'Strict liability' means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either
(1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for
doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence."
W KETO N, PRossER MAD KEEToz4 ON T E LAw oF TORTS § 75 (5th ed. 1984).
11 Garner, supra note 1, at 1436; Note, supra note 10, at 810; see James, The
Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54
CAnS. L. REv. 1550, 1550 (1966) ("The current trend in products liability cases is toward
imposing strict liability on the maker for the injurious effects of his product upon a consumer
or user when it is put to a foreseeable use.").
- 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
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Tobacco Co.,29 Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,30 and Stephen
v American Brands, Inc.3 1 involve strict liability claims by
plaintiffs against cigarette manufacturers.
3 2
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts33 (Restate-
ment), which deals directly with strict liability of manufactured
products, imposes liability on manufacturers who produce "any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer." ' 34 Therefore, for cigarette manufacturers to
be held strictly liable, plaintiffs must establish that cigarettes
conform to the wording of the Restatement.
3 5
523 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
- 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
31 825 F.2d 312 (lth Cir. 1987).
32 For a more exhaustive list of cases involving strict liability claims, see supra note
10.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A (1965) provides m full:
§ 402A. Special Lability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to-
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged m the-business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or. consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
34 Id.
iS Comment i to the R.srATE mNT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A attempts to explain
the meaning of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous." Comment i states in full:
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where
the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe
for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of
harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.
That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk,
and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a
dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Recently, plaintiffs have relied heavily on two theories of
strict liability, inadequate warmng and design defect, in at-
tempting to establish cigarettes as being "in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."136 These
two theories have caused a resurgence of litigation involving
cigarette manufacturers' liability for lung cancer.3 7
II. THm LABELiNG ACT
Despite the growing evidence that cigarette smoking is haz-
ardous to human health,38 Congress has decided not to prohibit
it. 3 9 Congress did decide, however, to regulate smoking and
health by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act (Labeling Act).4 The Labeling Act was originally
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreason-
ably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because,
if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart
attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.
R PTATmuNT (SEcoND) OF ToRrs § 402A comment 1 (1969).
3Id. at § 402A; see, e.g., cases cited supra note 11.
37 See Note, supra note 10, at 809.
"The American Cancer Society estimates that cigarette smoking is responsible for
85% of lung cancer cases among men and 75% among women-about 83% overall."
AMERICAN CANCiE SocIETY, CANCER FACTS & FRGoiRs 20 (1987). Also mentioned is the
fact that "[s]moking accounts for about 30% of all cancer deaths, is a major cause of heart
disease, and is linked to conditions ranging from colds and gastnc ulcers to chromc bronchitis
and emphysema." Id., see DANGEas OF SmomNo - BinE's oF Qunrro & RELATrvE RisKs
or REDicED ExosuRn 8-9, 33 (1980) (This pamphlet alleges that tobacco smoking also
causes, or is strongly associated with, cancer of the larnyx, mouth, esophagus, urinary
bladder, pancreas, and kidneys.).
39 CipolIone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in
part, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987); see Heanngs on H.R.
643, 1237, 3055, 6543 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1969) (statement of Dr. Sol R. Baker, Charman, Committee on
Tobacco and Cancer, American Cancer Society) ("[W]e are against prohibition. Some of
us lived through one era of prohibition, and we certainly would not like to see another.
We feel that it is the individual's right to smoke if he decides to. ").
'0 Labeling Act §§ 1331-1340. Congress amended certain provisons of the 1965
Labeling Act by the Pub. Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970) (the "1969 Act"), and again by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (the "1984 Act"). Section 1331 of the Labeling
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enacted in 1965, following a report of the Surgeon General of
the United States finding that cigarette smoking is a health
hazard to Americans and asking Congress to remedy this en-
dangerment through some form of legislation. 41 By enacting
the Labeling Act, Congress assumed exclusive control over
cigarette warnings, advertising and promotions, thereby prohib-
iting any state from requiring any other warning on cigarette
packages and advertisements.
42
The Labeling Act necessitates a uniform national warning
to inform consumers adequately of the health consequences of
cigarette smoking and ensures that "commerce and the national
economy" is "protected" and "not impeded by diverse, non-
uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising re-
gulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health. ' 43 Thus, the Labeling Act's purposes are twofold: (1)
it provides a national uniform warning system prohibiting in-
consistent requirements which would vary from state to state,
and (2) it protects the national economy by keeping the tobacco
industry financially undamaged.
III. PREEMPTION
A. Generally
Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause" and was
Act states m full:
Congressional declaration of policy and purpose
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of tls chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and
advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,
whereby -
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on
each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with tins declared policy and (B) not impeded
by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1149.
41 See nfra note 47.
4" Labeling Act § 1331; see, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F Supp. 1171,
1174 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1149.
" The Supremacy Clause states: "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
1987-88]
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first recognized in the landmark case of Gibbons v Ogden4 5
The Supremacy Clause "invalidates state laws that 'interfere
with, or are contrary to' federal law "46 To ensure that its
warning would be the only warning required, Congress included
two preemption provisions in the Labeling Act. These provi-
sions forbid states from requiring any statement relating to
smoking and health different from that which Congress explic-
itly provides. 47
There are basically three circumstances in which courts have
recognized that congressional acts preempt state law First,
Congress may preempt state law expressly 48 Second, Congress
may "occupy a given field," thus preempting state law within
that field. 49 If Congress "occupies the field" in a particular
which shall be made m Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, ci. 2.
Is 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court stated:
The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the
declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law. In every such case,
the act of congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the laws of the state,
though enacted in the exercise of powers Xiot controverted, must yield to it.
Id. at 210-11.
46 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712
(1985) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211).
4Labeling Act § 1334. Section 1334 provides in full:
§ 1334. Preemption
(a) Additional statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) State Regulations
-No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter.
41 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
49 Congress" intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room to supplement it," "because the Act of Congress
may touch a field in-which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law
and the character of obligations mposed by it may reveal the same purpose."
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F Supp. 1146, 1150-51 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in part,
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area, implied preemption takes effect and federal law preempts
state law. 0 Third, state law may be implicitly preempted when
it actually conflicts with the federal law.-" "Such conflict occurs
where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility' "52 "or where state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.' -53
B. Adequacy of Warning Claims
There is no debate that the Labeling Act expressly inhibits
state legislatures from enacting statutes or regulations which
require a different warmng from that dictated by Congress.
54
There is great controversy, however, regarding the Labeling
Act's preemptive effect on state common law damage actions
involving adequacy of warnings.
55
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
50 There are three ways to determine whether Congress has "occupied the field" in a
given area: "first, if there is a pervasive scheme of federal regulation in such area; second,
if the federal interest m such area is dominant; and third, if the objective of federal law in
such area and the obligation unposed by it reveal the same purpose." Cipollone, 593 F
Supp. at 1163-64.
' See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
' Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1151 (quoting Fonda Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
" Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
-1 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 907 (1987). The Third Circuit stated that "the district court did not question
that the [Labeling] Act prohibits state legislatures from requiring a warning on cigarette
packages that alters that provided m section 1333." Id., see Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 623 F Supp. 1189, 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1985). The District Court states: "It is
obvious that this statute prohibits the Tennessee legislature from requiring R.J. Reynolds to
use any statement relating to smoking and health other than the one congressionally
mandated." Id.
Compare Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512, slip op. (Cal. Su per. Ct. Contra
Costa County May 12, 1987) (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment)
(adequacy of warning claim are preempted by the Labeling Act) and Forster v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepm County July 2,
1987) (order and memorandum granting defendants' motion for summary judgment) (ade-
quacy of warning claims are preempted by the Labeling Act) with Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 633 F Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (adequacy of
warning claims are not preempted by the Labeling Act) and Cipollone; 593 F Supp. at
1146 (adequacy of warning claims are not preempted by the Labeling Act).
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Adequacy of warning is a strict liability claim used by
plaintiffs to argue that cigarettes are products "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."
5 6
Since most courts have ruled that the Labeling Act does not
expressly preempt these types of claims, express preemption
creates no dispute.5 7 Rather, the controversy concerns implied
preemption; in particular, it concerns whether state common
law adequacy of warning claims "conflict" with the Labeling
Act.
Cigarette manufacturers argue that state common law claims
conflict with the Labeling Act and thus are implicitly pre-
empted. 58 Manufacturers allege such claims "stand[] as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 5 9 In fact, the Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed the axiom that state common law damage
awards are preempted when they conflict with federal laws60 on
the theory that state law damage actions have a regulatory
effect which may inhibit congressional objectives.
61
5R6SrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 644 F Supp. 283, 287 (D.N.J. 1986) (The defect may be in the form of a manufacturing
flaw, design defect, or inadequate warning.).
'7 See, e.g., Palmer, 633 F Supp. at 1174; Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1155.
See, e.g., Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., No. 86-4004-RV, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 7, 1986) (order on motion to strike various affirmative defenses), rev'd, 825 F.2d
312 (11th Cir. 1987); Loving v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-48386, slip op. at 1
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris County March 27, 1987) (order granting defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment).
"' Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 ("state common law damage
actions have the effect of requirements that are capable of creating 'an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' " (quoting
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67)).
6* International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 813-14 (1987) (common law
damage clams brought under Vermont law against an alleged polluter preempted by
regulatory scheme established by Congress in Clean Water Act). "The Court found pre-
emption despite the presence in the Clean Water Act of two broadly-worded saving clauses
expressly preserving state law jurisdiction and common law suits and the absence of an
express preemption provision." Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company's Motion for Summary Judgment at 13 n.7, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip
op. (citing International Paper Co., 107 S. Ct. at 808).
61 Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from
state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed
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The test for identifying conflict between state common law
adequacy of warning claims and the Labeling Act requires
courts to examine the effect such claims have on the purposes
of the Labeling Act. 62 As previously mentioned, the Labeling
Act serves two functions. 63 First, it provides a national uniform
warning system. Second, it protects the national economy by
keeping the tobacco industry alive. Cigarette manufacturers
contend adequacy of warmng claims directly affect these pur-
poses, alleging "claims relating to smoking and health that
result in liability for noncompliance with warning, advertise-
ment, and promotion obligations other than those prescribed
in the [Labeling Act] have the effect of tipping the Act's
balance of purposes and therefore actually conflict with the
Act. "64 "Certainly exposing a manufacturer to potential dam-
ages on the basis of its warmng label is a way of requiring a
more stringent label." 65 As such, liability based on inadequate
warmng would conflict with Congress' intent to have uniform
warnings. 66 Manufacturers maintain that strict liability claims
structured on the failure to warn are preempted by the Labeling
Act because they directly challenge "the adequacy of the [Con-
gress'] warning on cigarette packages. "67 This contention
is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy. Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant
compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are
potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1959) (emphasis added);
see, e.g., Chicago & N.W Transp. Co. v. Kalo Bnck & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-18
(1981) (preempting common law negligence clams); Sperry v. Honda ex rel. Flonda Bar,
373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) ("Mhe authority of Congress is no less when the state power
which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary rather than by
the state legislature.").
" Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187; see Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980)
(The court must "examine first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of
the operation of the state law on these purposes.").
See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187; see Reach v. American Tobacco Co., No. L-08714-83,
slip op. at 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Camden County Feb. 13, 1987) (transcript of
proceedings on preemption motion).
"Roysdon, 623 F Supp. at 1191; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 U.S. at
247.
"Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187; see Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Forster, No. 85-4294,
slip op.
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was upheld by the Third Circuit in Cipollone v Liggett Group,
Inc.68 The Third Circuit ruled "that the Labeling Act preempts
all claims that: (1) challenge the adequacy of Congress' warn-
ing, (2) question the propriety of defendants' [manufacturers']
advertising and promotion practices, or (3) necessarily depend
on an assertion that the defendants had any duty to warn other
than as required by Congress." 69
Whereas cigarette manufacturers argue adequacy of warn-
ing claims are implicitly preempted by the Labeling Act, plain-
tiffs contend such claims are not preempted. First, plaintiffs
maintain "that although Congress intended to occupy a field,
that field did not include private 'rights and remedies tradi-
tionally defined solely by state law ' "70 "While the federal
interest in uniform cigarette labeling is dominant, remedying
personal injuries is distinct from it and traditionally has been
an area of state concern. Neither the objectives of nor obliga-
tions imposed by the Act reveal an intent to do away with
state tort remedies.' '71
Second, plaintiffs allege that state common law actions do
not conflict with the Labeling Act since it is not a physical
impossibility for both the Labeling Act and state law to exist.72
"[I]t is not 'impossible' for the defendants to be sued, found
liable, pay a damage award, and at the same time obey the
federal labeling and advertising requirements. ' 73
Third, plaintiffs contend there is "a presumption against
the preemption of state common law, in particular, since such
law concerns areas 'traditionally regarded as within the
- 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
69 Memorandum m Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion
for Summary Judgment at I1, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. (citing Cipollone, 789 F.2d at
187).
" Palmer, 633 F Supp. at 1176 (quoting Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186). The court
further stated: "Neither the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, the dominance
of the Federal interest, nor the objectives of and obligations unposed by the federal law
indicate that the field Congress meant to occupy included traditionally state-admimstered
products liability law." Id.
71 Id.
7See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167.
73 Palmer, 633 F Supp. at 1177.
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scope of state superintendence.' -74 Torts are exactly the-type
of legal actions that fall within the state's scope.
75
Plaintiffs' most compelling argument against preemption,
however, is simply that Congress' "silence on the issue of
common law claim preemption" in the Labeling Act means
that damages can be awarded for harm caused by inadequate
warnings and advertising.7 6 A statement by Congress pronounc-
ing that cigarette manufacturers "cannot be held liable in tort"
could have easily been made part of the Labeling Act if that
were Congress' intention, but no such pronouncement was con-
tained in the Act.7 7 In fact, several statutes unequivocally in-
clude common law damage claims within the scope of
preemption, 78 but the Labeling Act does not. At least two courts
have adopted the position that the Labeling Act does not pre-
empt state tort claims which challenge the adequacy of warn-
ings.79 The significance of these two decisions, however, has
been considerably weakened by recent case law involving ade-
quacy of warning claims.80
7' Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1152 (quoting Florida Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at
144); accord Palmer, 633 F Supp. at 1174.
15 Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 113; see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76 Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1173. The District Court in Palmer further noted: "The
legislative history also does not indicate that Congress sought to take over the traditionally
state-run area of tort compensation. Congressional discussions of preemption do not mention
the common law, but instead focus on executive or legislative regulation." Id. at 1176.
17 Cipollone, 593 F Supp. at 1148. "Before this court or any other court so cavalierly
rejects fundamental prnciples of the common law, it should demand a much more definitive
statement from Congress." Id.
71 Examples of statutes that include a preemption provision explicitly encom-
passing state common law include 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e)
(Supp, 111984) (Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial
Stability Act); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Copyright Act of 1976); and 29 U.S.C §
1144(a), (c)(1) (1982) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185-86 n.5.
79 Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1171; Montana v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 79850,
slip. op. (N.Y. Super. Ct. Lawrence County Oct. 9, 1986) (order granting defendants' motion
for partial summary judgment). "The Montana court initially followed Palmer, but recently
granted a motion for reargument and stayed further proceedings until the First Circuit's
decision um Palmer is announced." Memorandum m Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company's Motion.for Summary Judgment at 16 n.9, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip
op.
so The District Court decision in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. was recently reversed
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In light of the arguments for and against preemption of
state common law claims involving warnings, the arguments of
the cigarette manufacturers are more persuasive. The Third
Circuit in Cipollone became the first federal appellate court to
hold that the Labeling Act preempts tort claims challenging the
adequacy of warnings."' Recently, two federal appellate courts
have followed the Third Circuit's ruling in Cipollone,82 as have
many federal district courts and state courts.8 3 The rulings in
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that state tort claims challenging the adequacy
of warnings are preempted by the Labeling Act. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 629. Since the Montana
court stayed proceedings pending the First Circuit's decision in Palmer, that court is also
likely to hold that state tort claims challenging the adequacy of warnings will be preempted
by the Labeling Act.
11 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 523 A.2d 712, 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) (citing Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 181). "There is no conflict among the federal
circuit courts on the. preemption issue since Cipollone is the sole federal appellate decision
and the ughest judicial authority to date to have construed the act with respect to common
law tort claims." Id. at 715.
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 620; Stephen, 825 F.2d at 312; see Cigarette Warnings Ruled
Adequate, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 10.
13 Three federal district courts have ruled that the Labeling Act preempts state
law failure to warn claims against cigarette manufacturers:
a. Citing the "very specific preemption language" of Section 1334,
the court found it "obvious" that the Labeling Act precluded any state
legislative attempt to require different or additional warnings than Congress
has prescribed m Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp.
1189, 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir.
Jan. 20, 1986)-a case decided before the Third Circuit's decision in
Cipollone. The court then considered common law damage actions and
concluded that such attacks on the congressionally-prescribed warning were
likewise preempted. Id. at 1191. As the court recognized, allowing attacks
on Congress' warning in the context of tort actions "would permit [the]
state to achieve indirectly, through exposure to tort liability, what it could
not aclueve directly through legislation." Id. Because such a result would
flout the "stated intent of Congress to have uniformity in the warnings,"
clamis based on the adequacy of Congress' warning could not stand. Id.
b. In Johnson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. H-86-1343, slip
op. (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1986), Judge Hughes granted defendant cigarette
manufacturers' motion for summary judgment on all clais challenging
either the adequacy of the warning required by the labeling Act or defen-
dants' advertising and promotional activities. Noting that federal law
preempts state law damage actions that frustrate congressional objectives
and that "Congress' purpose m enacting this legislation was to avoid
conflicting laws and to create a uniform warning," the court found that
holding the defendant manufacturers liable, notwithstanding their compli-
ance with the Labeling Act, would 'have the effect of tipping the [Labeling]
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Cipollone and its progeny are rational and prudent. If a state
Act's balance of purposes and therefore actually conflict with the [Label-
ing] Act.' Id. at 3.
c. In Stephen v. Ameridan Brands, Inc., No. 86-4004-RV, slip op.
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1986), interlocutory appeal certified and accepted, No.
86-2100 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 1986), plaintiff alleged that a cigarette manu-
facturer had failed to warn adequately of an alleged risk of lung cancer,
and the manufacturer's answer maintained that such claims were pre-
empted by the Labeling Act. Faced with plaintiff's motion to strike the
preemption defense, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida canvassed the cases on this subject-including the
district court and the court of appeals' decisions in Cipollone-and reaf-
firmed the Labeling Act's preemptive effect.
In addition, five state courts have found that the Labeling Act preempts
state common law tort claims:
a. On March 27, 1987, the District Court of Hams County, Texas
in Loving v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-48386, slip op. (Tex.
Dist. Ct. March 27, 1987), granted Reynolds' motion for partial summary
judgment as to claims relating to Reynolds' marketing, promotion, and
advertising of cigarettes after December 31, 1965, because such claims
were preempted by the Labeling Act.
b. On March 17, 1987, the District Court of Galveston County,
Texas m Tyson v. Monsanto Co., No. 85-CV-0682, slip op. at 2 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. March 17, 1987), adopted the reasoning of the Cipollone and
Johnson decisions and held that the Labeling Act preempted plaintiffs'
clams based on Reynolds' "labeling, promotion, advertisingi and/or rec-
ommending the use of cigarettes" as well as claims based on "marketing
or promotion" of cigarettes.
c. On December 22, 1986, the Supenor Court of Bergen County,
New Jersey held: (1) that it was "bound by the Third Circuit's construction
of the [Labeling] Act" since "Cipollone is the sole federal appellate
decision and the highest judicial authority to date to have construed the
[Labeling] Act with respect to common law tort claims," and (2) that the
Labeling Act preempts all claims "alleging defendant's failure to warn or
provide adequate warning" or which "predicate liability on fraud and
rmisrepresentation in the defendant's advertising and promotion of its
cigarette products." Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., [523 A.2d 712,
716] (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986).
d. The Superior Court of Camden County, New Jersey, ruled on
February 13, 1987, that.
mo the extent that any claims of the plaintiff for damages against the
defendant allege as a basis the adequacy of warning or the propriety of
defendant's action with respect to advertising or promotion of cigarettes,
such claims are preempted by the federal act and must fall. Any claims
of the plaintiff for damages against the defendant alleging as a basis that
the defendant bore a duty to provide a warning to consumers in addition
to the warning Congress has required, again, such claims are preempted
by the federal act and must fall.
Reach v. American Tobacco Co., No. L-08714-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 13,
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could employ tort law to evolve its own requirements for la-
beling and advertising, it would directly conflict with the La-
beling Act and provide "diverse," "nonuniform," and
confusing requirements concerning statements relating to smok-
ing and health, 84 directly in conflict with congressional intent.
Preemption also seems sensible when considering that state
courts could formulate nonuniform requirements just as easily
as state legislatures.85 Each state has its own tort law and a
variety of judges who rule on this law; thus, inconsistent hold-
ings would no doubt result among the state courts.8 6 Such a
result would inevitably lead to nonuniform warnings on ciga-
rette packages, thereby circumventing Congress' objective of
providing a national uniform warning system.87 Therefore, state
common law claims challenging the adequacy of warnings should
be preempted by the Labeling Act.
88
C. Design Defect Claims Under Risk-Utility Analysis
Adequacy of warning is only one strict liability theory avail-
able to plaintiffs to demonstrate that cigarettes are in a "de-
1987), Tr. of Proceedings at 30-31.
e. Finally, in Sahli v, Manville Corp., No. 230512 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Contra Costa Cty. Oct. 10, 1986, Dec. 31, 1986, and March 2, 1987), the
court disnssed the plaintiff's failure to warn claims against Reynolds and
The American Tobacco Company and limited the scope of discovery based
on the ,preemptive effect of the Labeling Act.
Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 16-20, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op.
14 Labeling Act § 1331(2); see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
81 Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 21, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op.
86Id.
v Id.
" But see Comment, Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warn-
ings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 754 (1986) (authored by Robert C. Carlsen).
Carlsen submits that adequacy of warning clais are not preempted by the Labeling Act.
Carlsen examines the legislative history of the Labeling Act, and suggests that Congress
intended that common law tort claims would survive the passage of the Labeling Act. See
also Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued for Failure
to Warn Even Though They Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements?, 20 Loy.
L.A.L. Ra,. 867 (1987) (authored by Taylor A. Ewell). Ewell provides a nice discussion of
the preemption issue and ultimately concludes that adequacy of warning claims should not
be preempted by the Labeling Act.
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fective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer." 8 9 Another strict liability theory frequently imple-
mented is design defect. One method of determining whether a
product has a design defect is through the risk-utility analysis. 90
Risk-utility is a balancing test used in situations in which it is
hard to establish if a product is truly defective. 91 The risk-
utility analysis consists of seven factors which are used to
determine whether a product's risk outweighs its utility 92 A
number of courts have used this analysis to conclude that strict
liability should be applied to hold manufacturers liable for
producing defective and dangerous products.
93
" RSTATEmENT (SECOD) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). For the full text of § 402A see
supra note 33.
9* "The test is sometimes stated as whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer who
had knowledge of the defect would have distributed the product." Davidson, The Uncertain
Search for a Design Defect Standard, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 643, 645 (1981). "Other courts
apply another measure of design defect, the consumer-expectation test." Handguns and
Products Liability, 97 HARv. L. Rnv. 1912, 1913 n.7 (1984); see REsATMET (SEcom) OF
TORTS § 402A comment g (1965) (Strict liability applies when "the product is in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him."). This Comment will focus solely upon the risk-utility analysis.
" Handguns and Products Liability, supra note 90, at 1915-16.
91 The seven factors are as follows:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without inpairng its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or the emstence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973); see
Black, Nichols v. Union Underwear Co. and the Meaning of "Unreasonably Dangerous"
A Call for a More Precise Standard, 69 Ky. L.J. 419, 430-31 (1980-81). For an example of
judicial application of these factors, see generally Cipollone, 644 F Supp. at 287-88 n.1;
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978), overruled on other
grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979).
"See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskm Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983); Cepeda, 386 A.2d
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As with adequacy of warning, the first issue that must be
addressed is whether these design defect claims are preempted
by the Labeling Act.
Cigarette manufacturers and plaintiffs disagree on whether
such claims under the risk-utility analysis should be preempted
by the Labeling Act. The cigarette manufacturers' reasoning
that these claims should be preempted is convincing. First,
manufacturers maintain that labeling a universally known prod-
uct "defective" simply because its inherent danger outweighs
its social benefits "is totally without merit and totally unsup-
ported by legal precedent. It is a misuse of tort law, a baseless
and tortured extension of products liability principles.' 94
Second, manufacturers contend the only issue pertinent to
a determination of the reasonableness of the manufacturers'
design of the product is whether consumers have been ade-
quately informed of the risks, thus turning the design defect
theory into a question of adequacy of warning. 95 The only
option available to cigarette manufacturers to avoid liability
under the nsk-utility analysis (other than to stop selling ciga-
rettes altogether) is to provide more or different warmngs
through labeling or advertising.16 Thus, risk-utility claims di-
rectly conflict with the Labeling Act by challenging the ade-
quacy of the warnings required. 97 As such, manufacturers assert
that risk-utility claims are preempted by the Labeling Act.
Third, manufacturers claim that "even if the adequacy of
defendants' warnings were not in issue, a state law holding
at 816. The court m O'Brien stated:
[Certain] products, including some for which no alternative exists, are so
dangerous and of such little use that under the nsk-utility analysis, a manu-
facturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to others. That cost might
dissuade a manufacturer from placing the product on the market, even if the
product has been made as safe as possible.
O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 306.
9, Patterson v. Robin Gessellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985); see
Handguns and Products Liability, supra note 83, at 1917-18 (The author explains that none
of the rationales for the risk-utility test would justify its extension to products with inherent,
but well-known dangers such as handguns and alcohol.).
Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 9.
96 Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 26, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op.
9Id.
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them strictly liable for marketing cigarettes would run afoul of
Congress' intent to safeguard cigarette commerce as a part of
the national economy "98 That is, manufacturers allege that
adoption of the risk-utility analysis could possibly "price cig-
arettes out of the market, ' 99 directly conflicting with the policy
of Congress to protect the nation's commerce. This policy is
stated plainly in the Labeling Actec and is reflected in various
other statutes regulating tobacco. 101
Plaintiffs' arguments against preemption of design defect
claims under risk-utility are equally strong. First, plaintiffs
contend the risk-utility analysis can easily be applied to the
cigarette industry- "[T]he low utility of the industry and the
gravity of the risks it poses makes it an appropriate industry
for the imposition of such policy "02
Second, plaintiffs refute the manufacturers' "adequacy of
the warmng" argument since "such [an] argument miscasts the
role of failure-to-warn m risk/utility analysis. For failure-to-
warn is merely an alternate ground, rather than a necessary
prerequisite, for recovery under risk/utility theory.' '10 3 There
are two tests used to deterimne if a product is safe: (1) the
traditional risk-utility analysis, and (2) if the utility outweighs
the risks, whether these risks have been reduced to the greatest
extent possible without hurting the product's utility 104 Warning
cases involve the second test. The first test, the risk-utility
Cipollone, 649 F Supp. at 670.
,9 Cipollone, 644 F Supp. at 289.
' Labeling Act §§ 1331-1340; see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
, There are 259 references to tobacco and 93 references to cigarettes m the
United States Code. National tobacco marketing legislation is, for instance,
based on a legislative finding that "[tihe marketing of tobacco constitutes one
of the great basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities
winch directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and
stable conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare."
Memorandum in Support of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 27 n.11, Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
11 White, supra note 24, at 599.
m Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 670.
,01 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982). "Ac-
cording to this language, the first prong of nsk/utility analysis has nothing whatever to do
with the adequacy of defendants' warning labels. Rather, the simple question that Beshada
would pose at that stage is whether the product's risks outweigh its usefulness as it is
employed by the consumer." Cipollone, 649 F Supp. at 671.
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analysis, has nothing to do with adequacy of warmng.10 5 Thus,
failure-to-warn is an alternate ground. Only if the product's
utility outweighs its risks does adequacy of warmngs come into
play 106 Therefore, plaintiffs could bring their claims only under
traditional risk-utility analysis; as such, it is not preempted
because "there you would start with the proposition that at
least the warning was adequate.'
10 7
Third, plaintiffs reject manufacturers' argument "that all
of plaintiffs' strict liability claims must be dismissed because
they conflict with Congress' intent to promote the sale of
cigarettes." 108 Plaintiffs refute this "protection of the econ-
omy" argument by contending that Congress has the ability to
allow plaintiffs to recover under state law for injuries caused
by industries, subject to the working of the federal law regu-
lating such industries. 10 9 Thus, if Congress wanted to preempt
design defect claims the Labeling Act would contain the appro-
priate wording. According to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the Labeling Act, which regulates the cigarette industry,
does not preempt all of the plaintiffs' claims.110 Therefore,
unless such claims relate specifically to cigarette manufacturers'
"promotional and sales activities, or the adequacy of their
warnings," plaintiffs' strict liability claims are not preempted
merely because they affect manufacturers' profits.1 ' In fact,
many believe holding cigarette manufacturers liable for design
defect does not jeopardize the industry but merely "spreads
the risk.1
112
"I Cipollone, 649 F Supp. at 671.
106 Id. "It is only when this prong of risk/utility analysis is decided m the defendant's
favor, i.e., when it has already been determined that the product's utility does indeed
outweigh its nsks,, that the adequacy of the defendant's warnings even potentially enters
into the analysis." Id. But see Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 9; Memorandum m Support
of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion for Summary Judgment at 26,
Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op.
107 Reach, No. L-08714-83, slip. op. at 34.
Cipollone, 649 F Supp. at 672.
100 Id., see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1984), reh'g denied,
465 U.S. 1074 (1984).
See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
Cipollone, 649 F Supp. at 672.
112 See Wade, supra note 92, at 826. Dean Wade further states:
The idea is that the loss should not be allowed to remain with the injured
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The arguments on both sides have substantial merit and the
courts are divided on the issue. The contentions asserted by the
plaintiffs appear to be the more meritorious, however. Hence,
design defect claims under the risk-utility analysis should not
be preempted by the Labeling Act.
Recently, three courts have ruled that such claims are not
preempted. In Dewey v R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the
Superior Court of New Jersey proclaimed it did not "believe
that the [Labeling] [A]ct, as construed by the Third Circuit,
intended to preempt this kind of strict liability claim." 1 4 The
court further stated that "[a] design defect claim would not
have the effect of frustrating Congress' objective in enacting
the federal statute and does not conflict with the [Labeling]
[A]ct's two-fold purpose of providing warning to the public
and protecting national economic interests." 15 Thus, a design
defect claim should not be preempted by the Labeling Act. In
Reach v The American Tobacco Co.,i6 the Superior Court of
New Jersey ruled that the risk-utility analysis is not barred by
preemption because "there you would start with the proposition
that at least the warning was adequate.""11 7 The court further
stipulated that "[a]dequate warnings do not automatically mean
party on whom it fortuitously fell, but should be transferred to the manufac-
turer, who, by pricing his product, can spread it among all the consumers.
The extent to which a manufacturer may be free to "spread the risk" created
by his product can be the subject of some debate. A different way of
expressing essentially the same idea is to say that the activity of making the
particular product should pay its own way, that the enterprise should bear
the liability.
Id., see also Gamer, supra note i, at 1462-63. Professor Garner states:
Since welfare and private insurance pay most of a patient's medical bills, a
large portion of cigarette smoking costs are borne by the public. Disability,
life insurance, and family assistance programs spread other cigarette losses
over a large number of people as well. The annual burden on taxpayers for
tobacco related medical bills alone was estimated by ex-Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare Joseph Califano to be somewhere between five and
eight billion dollars, Thus, tobacco companies do not pay their way.
Id.
1 523 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
14 Id. at 716.
t' Id. at 717.
No. L-08714-83, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Camden County Feb. 13,
1987).
17 Id. at 34.
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a product is free from a defect. "118 And in Cipollone v
Liggett Group, Inc. ,119 the United States District Court of New
Jersey on remand ruled that the risk-utility analysis is not
"necessarily" preempted by the Labeling Act.2 0 The court
noted that "[it is important to remember that in deciding these
issues the court makes no finding or prediction as to whether
this plaintiff or others with similar claims will ultimately suc-
ceed. What is at stake here is the fundamental right to present
those claims to a court of competent jurisdiction for adjudi-
cation."
121
This is a logical conclusion for two reasons. First, the Third
Circuit in Cipollone clearly ruled that not all claims should be
preempted by the Labeling Act.12 2 It can be easily inferred that
design defect claims are the type of postulates the Third Circuit
was protecting from preemption. Second, to proclaim that
holding manufacturers liable for a design defect would put the
cigarette industry out of business is an inaccurate evaluation
of the situation. The cigarette manufacturers can "spread the
risk" of liability by increasing the price of cigarettes to the
consumer 23 and thus remain in business by passing along the
cost of liability awards to the users of the product. Also,
cigarette manufacturers could produce substitute products for
consumers to use or they could diversify into other product
areas. This action would help keep the cigarette industry alive.
IV RisK-UTILITY AND COLLATERAL BENEFITS
Assuming, arguendo, that design defect claims under the
risk-utility analysis are not preempted by the Labeling Act,
cigarette manufacturers may yet be shielded from strict liability
Even if design defect claims are not preempted by the Labeling
Act, such result does not signify that plaintiffs will always
prevail in design defect cases. Courts utilizing the risk-utility
analysis must consider all its factors before determining whether
I's Id.
119 649 F Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
,2D Id. at 671.
121 Id. at 675.
I21 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
12 See supra note 112.
[VOL. 76
1987-88] CIGARETTE MANuFACTURERS' LiABmrrY
a product's risk outweighs its utility Therefore, if cigarette
manufacturers can demonstrate that the utility of cigarettes
outweighs their risks, they will not be liable for design defects.
Although numerous factors are weighed in the risk-utility
analysis, 24 one factor has spawned much controversy between
plaintiffs and cigarette manufacturers. 25 This factor is stated
as follows: "The usefulness and desirability of the product-
its utility to the user and to the public as a whole."'' 26
Plaintiffs contend the advantages to society of manufactur-
ing cigarettes are not germane to the risk-utility analysis. 27 Tis
position was upheld in Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc.128 when
the District Court of New Jersey ruled that, under New Jersey's
strict liability law, cigarette manufacturers could not introduce
evidence as to the cigarette industry's collateral benefits to the
economy as part of their defense to strict liability claims prem-
ised on risk-utility analysis.
129
Cigarette manufacturers assert that such an interpretation
of the risk-utility analysis is improper. They assert that utility
should be measured both in terms of utility to society as a
whole and in terms of the individual plaintiff's utility gained
from smoking. 130 Thus, cigarette manufacturers claim that col-
224 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
12 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F Supp. 283, 287 (D.N.J. 1986).
'2 See supra note 92 (emphasis added).
11 Cipollone, 644 F Supp. at 287.
' 644 F Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986).
t Id. at 288. "The analysis was never meant to balance the risk to consumers against
the general benefit to society. Rather, the sole question presented is whether the risk to the
consumers exceeds the utility to those consumers." Id. at 290.
I See d. at 285. Defendant's answer to Plaintiff's interrogatory concerning risk-utility
was as follows m the Cipollone case:
The cuef component of the social utility of cigarettes is the enjoyment that
they provide the millions of individuals in this country who have chosen to
smoke.
The cigarette industry is a major contributor to the nation's economy.
The industry provides thousands of jobs in manufacturing and m sales.
Cigarettes are an important export and as such have a favorable impact upon
the nation's balance of trade. And, of course, the industry contributes sub-
stantially to the public fisc by way of its payment of federal, state and local
taxes.
In the Congressional deliberations that led to passage of the Federal
Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act (1965), prohibition of the sale of
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lateral benefits to the economy should be examined in the risk-
utility analysis.
It seems clear that collateral benefits should be given weight
in the nsk-utility analysis. The first factor of the analysis
explicitly denotes that utility is to be considered for "the public
as a whole," as well as for the user.' 3 ' As such, both cigarette
manufacturers and plaintiffs should be allowed to introduce
evidence demonstrating the utility of smoking to society as a
whole. That is, cigarette manufacturers should be allowed to
introduce evidence demonstrating the industry's collateral ben-
efits to the economy; and plaintiffs should be allowed to intro-
duce evidence involving the effects of smoking on the public.
Admitting this evidence will not conclusively prove that the
utility of cigarettes outweighs their risks or vice versa. By
admitting such evidence, however, the courts will be following
the language used in the risk-utility analysis, thus adhering to
its principles.
V KENTUCKY'S ALTERNATIVE
In 1966, the Kentucky courts adopted the doctrine of strict
liability as set out in section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts.132 This doctrine holds a manufacturer liable for phys-
ical harm caused by any product sold "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 133
In Nichols v Union Underwear Co., 34 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court defined the phrase "unreasonably dangerous,""'3
cigarettes was considered. Congress opted instead to allow their sale-and to
prevent the destruction of the tobacco industry-as long as consumers were
given the prescribed warning. Liggett contends that the Act evinces a Con-
gressional determination (I) that cigarettes have social utility; (2) that the
social utility of cigarettes sold with the prescribed warning on the package
outweighs any risk associated with such cigarettes; and (3) that ultimately only
the individual can make the risk/utility analysis since the decision whether or
not to smoke is a personal one.
Id. (citation omitted).
"I See-supra note 92o(emphasis added).
132 Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
01 R.STATEE ,T (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 402A (1965); see supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text.
"4 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
" Id. at 433.
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thus adopting the "prudent manufacturer test. '" 13 6 This test
"focuses on whether a prudent manufacturer, aware of the
qualities, characteristics, and actual condition of the product
would place the product on the market.' 1 37 In so doing, the
court rejected the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" used
by the Restatement in comment 1,13  better known as the "con-
sumer expectation" test. 3 9 Also, the court in Nichols held that
"consumer knowledge is only one of the factors that
should be before the jury in determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous.'
4 0
While the Nichols decision gave courts one factor to be
utilized in determining whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous, it failed to provide a checklist of other factors to be
considered. 141 In 1984, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Montgomery Elevator Co. v McCullough4 2 stated several
factors which merit consideration. "Considerations such as
feasibility of making a safer product, patency of the danger,
warnings and instructions, subsequent maintenance and repair,
misuse, and the product's inherently unsafe characteristics" all
have a bearing on whether a product is to be considered un-
reasonably dangerous. 4 3 These factors are analogous to those
used in the risk-utility analysis.' 44 In fact, Justice Lukowsky,
in a concurring opinion in Nichols, recited the risk-utility anal-
ysis and resolved "that whether a design is unreasonably dan-
11 Id. This name was given to this test in Adams, Torts, 73 Ky. L.J. 481, 499 (1984-
85).
" Adams, supra note 136.
,' RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTs § 402A comment 1 (1965); see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
I" See Nichols, 602 S.W.2d at 432. See generally Black, supra note 92, at 420-28 (TIs
article provides a good discussion of the rise and fall of the consumer expectation test.).
110 Nichols, 602 S.W.2d at 433; see Black, supra note 92, at 420.
"I Black, supra note 92, at 428. Black states: "[w]hile the [Nichols] court provided a
proper jury instruction of a new trial on the Nichols facts, it failed to provide guidelines
for other products liability actions. Thus, as the concurring opinion declared the majority
opinion left Kentucky products liability law unnecessarily vague." Id. at 428-29.
1,2 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984).
14' Id. at 780-81.
" Adams, supra note 136, at 499. See supra note 92 for a list of the factors used in
the risk-utility analysis.
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gerous must be determined by a social utility standard-risk
versus benefit.
' 145
Logic would seem to dictate that since the risk-utility anal-
ysis is markedly similar to the prudent manufacturer test adopted
in Nichols and modified by Montgomery, Kentucky courts
should adopt a risk-utility analysis when determining whether
a design is unreasonably dangerous. 146 As a result, uniformity
would be provided in jury instructions and uncertainty would
be mimmized. When a court administers jury instructions using
the risk-utility analysis, it clearly outlines the jury's nussion;
on the other hand, instructions using the prudent manufacturer
test fail "to convey to the jury the ultimate determination that
it is asked to make-that of risk versus benefit. Assuming the
jury to know what an 'ordinarily prudent company' is, the
instruction only impliedly asks the jury to weigh the risk against
benefit.'" 47
Because of this deficiency, Kentucky courts should adopt
the risk-utility analysis. Kentucky courts have yet to encounter
a case involving a strict liability design defect claim against a
cigarette manufacturer. With the rash of cigarette litigation
confronting this nation's courts, however, Kentucky will inev-
itably encounter such a situation. When such a case arises, the
risk-utility analysis should be used to decide whether the risk
of manufacturing cigarettes outweighs the utility 141
"I Nichols, 602 S.W.2d at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring). Justice Lukowsky wrote:
The bottom line is that the trier of fact is required to balance two pairs of
factors existing at the time of manufacture: (1) the likelihood that the product
would cause the claimants harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those
harms; against (2) the manufacturer's burden of designing a product that
would have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that alternative
design would have on the usefulness of the product. That is to say that the
manufacturer is not liable unless at the time of manufacture the magnitude
of the danger to the claimant outweighed the utility of the product to the
public.
Id.
1 See Black, supra note 92, at 434-35 (Black also agrees that the risk-utility analysis
should be used in Kentucky.); Jenkins & Green, Torts, Kentucky Law Survey, 69 Ky. L.J.
663, 665-70 (1980-81) (The authors feel the prudent manufacturer test and the risk-utility
analysis are ultimately the same test but differ in orientation.).
1' Jenkins & Green, supra note 146, at 670.
149 In 1978 Kentucky adopted the Product Liability Act of Kentucky. Ky. Ra,. STAT.
ANN. §§ 411.300-.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). This Act deals specifically with design
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CONCLUSION
The strict liability theories of adequacy of warning and
design defect have caused a resurgence of litigation involving
cigarette manufacturers' liability for lung cancer 149
Most courts have held adequacy of warning claims to be
preempted by the Labeling Act; that is, these claims actually
conflict with the purposes of the Labeling Act. °50 Design defect
claims brought under the risk-utility analysis have created a
much stronger debate among the courts, however. In light of
the decisions in Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc.,' 51 Dewey v
R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co.,i52 and Reach v The American
Tobacco Co.,153 a design defect claim under risk-utility may be
brought by plaintiffs to hold cigarette manufacturers liable for
lung cancer.
54
The Kentucky courts have yet to face a case involving this
situation. When confronted with common law adequacy of
warning claims in cigarette litigation, the courts should adopt
the prevailing view that such claims are preempted by the
Labeling Act. Furthermore, when the inevitable confrontation
with design defect claims occurs, the courts should use the risk-
utility analysis to determine whether a product is unreasonably
defect clamis. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective m
design. Thus, a product is presumed not to be defectively designed until this presumption
is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. "[l]f a preponderance of
the evidence indicates that the industry has adopted careless standards, liability may be
imposed." Miller, The Kentucky Law of Products Liability in a Nutshell, 12 N. KY. L.
Rnv. 201, 224 (1985) (quoting International Harvester v. Riffe, 2 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH)
9661, 23,906 (June 3, 1983)). See generally Ashdown & Hoskins, Torts, Kentucky Law
Survey, 67 Ky. L.J. 695 (1978-79) CTis article gives a complete discussion of the Product
Liability Act of Kentucky.). This Act clearly will affect design defect claims brought by
plaintiffs against cigarette manufacturers. However, the Act will not circumvent the use of
the risk-utility analysis by Kentucky courts. This analysis is a method of deternining whether
a product is defectively designed, i.e., "unreasonably dangerous" as set out in § 402A of
the RsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs.
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text.
649 F Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
523 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
" No. L-08714-83, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Camden County Feb. 13,
1987).
I" See supra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
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dangerous, and in particular, whether cigarettes are unreason-
ably dangerous.155
James C. Thornton
I See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text.
